
# The GAP Between AI Development and Automotive Safety Criteria

Christian Müller


# Background



# Types of AI — Basic Validation Requirements



Comments like this on relevance for OpenGenesis will appear




"Only a small fraction of real-world ML systems, is, somposed of the ML code"

#### Improving the

**Process** 


#### Al Platform



Currently driven forward by German car industry and research institutes (VDA, VW, Bosch, DLR, Fraunhofer, DFKI) in multi-million EUR VDA lead initiative. (VDA = Association of the German automotive industry).

Area for OpenGenesis? I don't think so. Rather OpenGenesis uses an Al platform

#### Validation in a Digital Reality Scenario Knowledge source



Area for OpenGenesis? Definitely, I believe.

#### Black Box, Grey Box, White Box

Learning Paradigm/Regime



We can test the AI module but we **cannot look inside** because a) we are not allowed b) we don't have competences c) the module does not reveal such insights — it is uninterpretable (like today's DNNs)

Grey Box

We can obtain additional information about the behavior of the model and its inner logic, i.e. by debugging it. We have access to the inside of the module and both the competencies and rights to derive such information

Light Grey Box

Important for reasonability

Goal

We fully understand the behavior of the module like with a human-engineered function. Not possible with todays DL regimes; to some extend with symbolic Al. Scientists works in this direction: hybrid learning seems promising. It is unlikely that in practice, boxes will ever be pure white (lack of competencies in testing facilities, residual inexplicable aspects of the model).


Scientific Utopia

OEMs expect this situation

A goal ... also for OpenGenesis

#### Al and Automotive from a Validation Perspektive

KPI



If this is not THE area for OpenGenesis, I wouldn't know what else would be.

### Validation Methods — a Human Analogy







Neurological experiment

Systematic experiment as in cognitive psychology

Anomaly detection as in psychological expert reporting

Debugging, AI tools

Systematic test in digital (virtual) environments. See next slide(s)

Large-scale system level testing in real environments

All three "disciplines" are necessary and deliver valuable insights

Area for OpenGenesis? Tools, systematic experiments: yes, large-scale testing: maybe supporting to some extend

#### Standards: ISO 262626

- Application of ISO262626 "Functional Safety" used to support the necessary argumentation regarding the absence of an inappropriate risk <u>due to failure of the system</u>.
- It regards approaches for avoiding <u>systematic hardware and</u> <u>software errors</u> as well as random hardware failures.
- Applying only isolate26262 on the development processes for autonomous driving, in particular in application of Al-based functions, cannot guarantee the desired level of safety.

#### Standards: SOTIF

- A first attempt towards a new industrial consensus in the area of driver assistance systems (ISO/PAS 21448 "Safety of the Intended Functionality") is supposed to minimize an inappropriate risk in relation to any danger, <u>i.e. through limitations of the system.</u>
- However, the analysis SOFTIF foresees, are only to a <u>limited</u> <u>extend applicable to Al-based functions</u>. Further measures are necessary.
- Furthermore, SOTIF is <u>applicable only to ADAS up to automation</u>
  <u>level SAE 2</u>. For higher automation levels, extensions are necessary.

### Equivalence-Classes in the Input Space

- Promising approach: systematically identify system-critical influencing factors of the <u>input space</u>. (here: scenarios)
- Then, those factors could be analyzed and reduced with known methods and tools.
- On important step is to <u>summarize the input space in equivalence</u>classes.

## Contract-Based Design (CBD)

- CBD specification: guarantee for the result of a function under the assumption that the <u>input fulfills its specification</u>
- can also be used to specify that the use of an Al-based function in a <u>defined environment ("assumption") leads to a defined result</u> (<u>"guarantee"</u>)
- Guarantees can be derived <u>according to safety criteria</u>
- Based on a <u>domain analysis</u> and characteristics of the system architecture, <u>assumptions can be derived.</u>
- For a given function, which fulfills this safety-"contract", we can now validate <u>whether it satisfies the safety goals</u>.


# Open Questions Regarding CBD

- How can we conduction a systematic domain analysis for a given function?
- How can we derive assumptions?
- How can we describe safety goals as guarantees?
- How can they be verified with a systematic test strategy?
  - In particular: are the KPIs valid with respect to assumptions and guarantees?
  - A KPU is valid if it allows implications about an AI-based function in the planned usage scope.

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#### GWM – i-Pilot 1.0 – Safety Design



#### Conclusions

- For trustworthy AI, we need to consider the knowledge source, the learning paradigm, the KPIs (respectively safety criteria) and the process.
- A well-designed AI platform is important to improve the processes and thus the overall quality of the outcome
- Progress in AI towards whitening the box is essential. Together with semantic deep learning, hybrid learning is a very promising direction in research (also at iMotion Germany).
- We need to find ways to better translate AI KPIs into functional safety requirements
- Systematic experiments are also important, not only large-scale testing (analogy to Human)
- Contract-based validation has the potential to be the missing link at the end of the KPI "chain".
- Announcement: Kick-off of OpenGenesis project with TÜV Süd, DFKI, others, April 30th